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Randall W. Eberts and Stephen A. Wandner
Responding to the Needs 
of Workers during the 
Great Recession
During the Great Recession 
of 2007–2009, the number of 
unemployed seeking assistance from 
the public workforce system more 
than doubled from prerecession levels. 
The unprecedented number of public 
workforce participants tested the 
capacity of the system to serve their 
needs. Before the recession, the federal 
workforce programs had been funded 
at fairly constant levels, and there 
appeared to be little excess capacity in 
the programs to accommodate a sizable 
influx of participants. This article 
examines the response of the three major 
public workforce programs and the 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) system 
in meeting the needs of workers during 
and immediately following the recent 
recession. It summarizes the findings 
of one chapter of a much larger study 
supported by and prepared for the U.S. 
Department of Labor (Eberts, Wandner, 
and Cai 2012). 
To help meet the challenges of a 
deepening recession, Congress passed the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) in the first quarter of 2009, 
a year after the recession began. The bill 
appropriated more than $800 billion to be 
used over a two-year period from 2009Q2 
through 2011Q2 to help stimulate the 
economy and provide funding to support 
essential services. The U.S. Department 
of Labor received roughly $66 billion, 
of which $45 billion supported and 
expanded the UI system by extending 
benefits and modernizing the system. The 
three federal workforce programs that 
provide most of the job search assistance 
and training services—the Workforce 
Investment Act Adult and Dislocated 
Worker programs and the Wagner-Peyser 
Employment Service (ES)—received 
$2.1 billion, about 75 percent of the 
PY2009 appropriations for the three 
programs. 
Even with these additional funds, the 
question facing the public workforce 
system was how fast and effectively 
could it use these funds, along with the 
regular annual appropriations, to respond 
to the needs of the influx of unemployed 
workers? A complicating factor was the 
partnership among the federal, state, and 
local entities in providing these services, 
since it is the local entities that actually 
spend the funds to provide job search 
assistance and training services. The 
U.S. Department of Labor issued several 
directives to states and local Workforce 
Investment Boards to encourage them to 
spend the money as quickly as possible 
and to focus on training services to 
The majority of ARRA funds 
were spent long before the 
number of workforce system 
participants peaked.
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the extent financially feasible (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2009). 
The Need
Soon after the economy began to slip 
into a recession at the end of 2007, the 
number of unemployed rose dramatically. 
Within four quarters, the number of 
workers who lost their jobs climbed 7.7 
million in 2008Q1 to 12.8 million in 
2009Q1—a 66 percent increase. By the 
end of 2009, unemployment peaked at 
15.2 million, or 10.0 percent of the labor 
force, more than double the number 
before the recession began.
As the number of unemployed 
escalated, the major public workforce 
programs quickly became inundated 
with people seeking short-term income 
support, job search assistance, and 
training. The first line of support for the 
unemployed is typically the UI system. 
The number filing for UI benefits (initial 
claims) surged from 4.9 million a quarter 
in 2008Q1 to 8.5 million a quarter in 
2009Q1—a 73 percent increase within 
the first year of the recession (Figure 
1). All three workforce programs 
experienced large jumps in the number 
of participants, but the influx into these 
programs did not start until later. By 
2010Q1, the number of ES participants 
increased 45 percent, WIA Adult 
participants jumped 102 percent, and 
WIA Dislocated Worker participants 
surged 188 percent. During that quarter, 
ES served 4.9 million participants, 
WIA Adult served 560,000, and WIA 
Dislocated Worker served 410,000. In 
total, the three programs were serving 
2 million more customers during that 
quarter than they were two years prior to 
that time.
The Response
The three programs offering job 
search assistance and training made 
relatively quick use of the supplemental 
funds from ARRA. The ES spent the 
ARRA funds the fastest, with 85 percent 
of the available funds expended in the 
first five quarters. If the funds were spent 
evenly over the nine quarters, 55 percent 
of the funds would be expended during 
the first five quarters. The WIA Adult 
program spent 72 percent of its available 
supplemental funds the first five quarters, 
and the WIA Dislocated Worker program 
spent 60 percent. 
However, the level of funding was 
not enough to match the influx of 
participants. For example, while total 
expenditures for the WIA Adult program 
grew 30 percent from the prerecession 
period to the ARRA funding period, that 
increase was eclipsed by the 157 percent 
increase in the number of participants 
during that same period (Table 1). 
Thus, expenditures per participant fell 
by 49 percent. The WIA Dislocated 
Worker program experienced the same 
percentage decline in expenditures per 
participant. The ES program saw a 30 
percent decline in the funds available 
per participant. Furthermore, the timing 
of the expenditure of funds was out of 
sync with the increase in participants. 
As shown in Figure 1, the number of 
participants in the three programs did 
not peak until 2011Q2, even though a 
majority of the funds were spent before 
2009Q3. Therefore, in addition to fewer 
funds per participants overall, the desire 
to spend the ARRA money as quickly 
as possible left even fewer resources for 
those who entered the programs at a later 
date.
The bunching of expenditures in the 
first half of the ARRA funding period is 
evident in the timing of the provision of 
services. Three types of WIA services are 
tracked over time: 
Figure 1  Percentage Change in the Number of Participants of the ES, WIA Adult, 
WIA Dislocated Worker (DW) Programs, and the Number of UI Initial 
Claims (IC) from 2008Q1
Table 1  Percentage Changes in Number of Participants and Expenditures from the 
Prerecession Period to the Recovery Act Period, by Program
NoTE: Percentage changes are calculated between the time periods 2005Q3–2007Q4 and 
2009Q2–2011Q2, based on quarterly averages within each period.  
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Program
ES WIA Adult WIA DW
Participants 58.9 156.7 183.5
Expenditures with Recovery Act funds 11.2   30.3   40.7
Average expenditure/participant with 
Recovery Act funds
        −30.0          −49.3          −50.3
The ability to expand capacity 
to provide the additional 
services speaks well of the 
responsiveness of the workforce 
system, as evidenced by the 
sheer numbers served.
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1) Intensive services, which include 
staff-assisted job search assistance, 
such as comprehensive reemployment 
assessments, development of individual 
employment plans, and counseling and 
career planning. 
2) Training services, such as 
occupational training and basic skills 
training. 
3) Supportive services, which offer 
transportation, child care, housing, and 
needs-related payments to those who 
need assistance in order to participate in 
the programs. 
Not tracked in this study are core 
services, which are typically self-assisted 
services with little staff intervention. For 
both the WIA Adult and WIA Dislocated 
Worker programs, a higher percentage 
of participants received the higher-cost 
intensive and training services once 
the ARRA funding became available 
than was the case before the recession. 
However, this increase was short lived. 
By 2010Q2, the percentages had returned 
to their prerecession levels and after that 
time fell even lower. 
The ability to expand capacity to 
provide the additional services speaks 
well of the responsiveness of the 
workforce system, as illustrated by the 
sheer numbers served. The number of 
WIA Dislocated Worker customers 
receiving intensive services increased 
from 46,000 in 2008Q3 to 114,000 
in 2009Q3. During that same time 
period, the number receiving training 
increased from 21,000 to 56,000, and 
those receiving supportive services grew 
from 12,500 to 26,000. However, the 
heightened service receipt lasted only 
one quarter before starting to decline. 
By the following quarter, service receipt 
among the three types of services fell by 
as much as 30 percent and continued to 
decline throughout the remainder of the 
ARRA funding period. For example, the 
percentage of entrants receiving high-
cost training services reached 30 percent 
as ARRA funding became available in 
the middle of 2009, but within a year 
the percentage fell back to 10 percent. 
Furthermore, as the influx of participants 
taxed the system’s capacity to provide 
services, customers had to wait longer 
before they received services. For 
example, the number of days between 
the time a person registered for the WIA 
Dislocated Worker program and the time 
he or she first received training services 
increased dramatically, from 54 days in 
2007Q3 to 95 days in 2008Q3. 
The WIA Adult program exhibited a 
similar pattern. From 2008Q3 through 
2009Q3, the number receiving intensive 
services grew from 103,000 to 156,000, 
those receiving training jumped from 
37,000 to 60,000, and those receiving 
supportive services increased from 
23,000 to 33,000. Similar to the 
availability of WIA Dislocated Worker 
services, the surge in WIA Adult services 
lasted only a few quarters. The increase 
in waiting time for services was also 
similar, increasing by 35 days between 
2007Q3 and 2008Q3. 
The Effect
The number of WIA program 
participants who found employment 
immediately after exiting the programs 
steadily increased throughout the ARRA 
funding period. From 2009Q1 through 
2010Q3, the number of WIA Adult 
exiters who found employment increased 
Figure 2  Number of Employed and Entered Employment Rate of Those Leaving 
the WIA Dislocated Worker Program
 
from 107,000 in 2008Q3 to 159,000 
in 2010Q3, an increase of 50 percent. 
The WIA Dislocated Worker program 
registered even larger percentage gains: 
exiters who found employment grew 
from 45,000 to 106,000, an increase of 
135 percent. These increases stand in 
sharp contrast to the national trends in 
hiring and job creation. Nationwide, the 
number of hires declined by 2.8 percent 
and the number of private sector jobs 
fell by 2.2 percent during that period. 
However, much of the increase in job 
placement can be attributed to the greater 
number of people in the program. When 
looking at the rate of employment 
(exiters finding work divided by the total 
number of exiters), the rate for WIA 
Adult exiters stayed roughly the same, 
as the number of exiters rose at about the 
same rate as those employed. However, 
the employment rate for WIA Dislocated 
Worker customers fell, as the number 
of exiters outpaced those finding work 
(Figure 2). 
Summary
The analysis suggests that the U.S. 
workforce system responded to the needs 
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Burt S. Barnow, John Trutko, and Jaclyn Schede Piatak
How Do We Know 
Occupational Labor 
Shortages Exist?
The term labor shortage has no 
universally agreed upon definition. It 
sometimes refers to a shortfall in the total 
number of individuals in the labor force, 
and sometimes denotes the possible 
mismatch between workers and jobs in 
the economy. In our recently published 
book, Occupational Labor Shortages: 
Concepts, Causes, Consequences, 
and Cures, we define an occupational 
labor shortage as a sustained market 
disequilibrium between supply and 
demand in which the quantity of workers 
demanded exceeds the supply available 
and willing to work at the prevailing 
wage and working conditions at a 
particular place and point in time. (Please 
see www.upjohn.org/Publications/Titles/
occupationalLaborShortages for more 
information about the book.) In general, 
the quantity of labor that workers are 
willing to provide is an increasing 
function of the wages (i.e., price) they 
can obtain, and the relationship between 
wages and the amount that workers are 
willing to provide at various prices, with 
other factors held constant, is referred to 
as the labor supply curve. 
Figure 1 shows a typical upward-
sloping supply curve for labor. As the 
wage rate is increased, more workers are 
willing to enter a particular occupation, 
and current workers are generally willing 
to provide more labor. In Figure 1, the 
amount of labor that employers wish to 
hire at alternative prices is indicated by 
the downward-sloping demand curve. 
The point labeled E in Figure 1 is the 
market equilibrium point. If the wage is 
equal to WE , then the quantity of labor 
that workers are willing to supply at that 
wage (QE) is exactly equal to the quantity 
of labor that employers will wish to hire. 
The market is in equilibrium because 
the quantity supplied is equal to the 
quantity demanded. If, for some reason, 
the prevailing wage rate in the market is 
W0 rather than WE, then the quantity of 
labor that workers are willing to supply 
is equal to QS—the point on the supply 
curve corresponding to W0. Employers, 
however, would like to hire QD at that 
wage rate. The difference between the 
amount of labor that employers wish 
to hire and the amount that workers 
are willing to provide (QD − QS) is the 
amount of the shortage. 
Unfortunately, identifying a shortage 
is not easy. Just as the concept of “full 
employment” does not mean zero 
unemployment, a labor market is likely 
to have some vacancies in equilibrium; 
thus, the question is: When are there 
excess vacancies that signify a shortage? 
Likewise, markets do not adjust 
instantaneously to shocks, so how long 
must a market have excess vacancies 
before it is considered to have a shortage? 
Drawing the line between a shortage 
and a tight labor market is not easy. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not 
publish data on vacancies by occupation, 
so even if there was agreement on what 
constitutes a shortage, the data needed to 
identify shortages do not exist. 
Economists and other analysts have 
proposed alternative definitions of 
occupational shortages. Early studies 
by Arrow and Capron (1959) and Blank 
and Stigler (1957) defined shortages 
as situations where demand for labor 
increases faster than supply can grow—a 
condition sometimes observed in the 
market for engineers during economic 
booms. Although rapid increases in 
How long must a market have 
excess vacancies before it is 
considered to have a shortage?
of workers during the recent recession, 
but the resources available, even with 
the ARRA funding, were insufficient 
to provide the same level of services 
throughout the two-year ARRA funding 
period that the system provided before 
the recession. Calculations, described 
in the larger study, estimate that an 
additional $8.5 billion, on top of the 
$2.03 billion appropriated under ARRA, 
would have been needed to provide 
prerecession-level services to the influx 
of participants into the three programs. 
A conscious decision was made to 
spend money on passive policies, such 
as extending UI benefits, instead of 
providing additional dollars for more 
active policies, such as job search 
assistance and training. Furthermore, 
the desire to spend the ARRA funds as 
quickly as possible left fewer resources 
available later on when the largest 
numbers of participants were still in 
the programs. Nonetheless, the system 
exhibited a capacity to expand services, 
albeit for a short period of time, and to 
help people get back to work. 
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